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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
At this point, we will not make a formal statement 
of the fuct.s in this case, but will. discuss t~ facts under 
our Poinrt II. We will first seek to establish that this 
Court used an erroneous rule for appellate review in a 
case where there was a verdict and judgment in favor of 
plaintiff here. We will then seek to establish the rule 
that should have been fo1lowed by this Court and based 
upon thart rule, and a discusffion of the evidence most 
favorable to plaintiff, we will seek to show that the Court 
should ei.ither grant a rehearing or in the alternative to 
affirm the verdict and judgment of the trial court. 
POINT I. 
THE COURT USED AN ERRONEOUS RULE 
FOR APPELLATE REVIEW AND, IN FACT, 
IT SHOULD HAVE USED THE RULE THAT 
IT WOULD LOOK TO THE EVIDENCE 
MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND JUDG-
MENT. 
This Court started its opinion on a false premise and 
worked from there to an erroneous conclusion. The Court 
states: 
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"Counsel reminds us that v.:e must re,·iew 
the evidence in a light favorable to the verdict. 
'Ve will do this by not reporting or consider-
ing the evidence adduced by defendant, but 
only that of the plaintiff, and holding the 
plaintiff responsible for any such evidence 
representing both the less favorable to its con-
tentions as well as that which may be more 
favorable." 
The first sentence pays lip service t,o the rule con-
tended frn- by plainitiff. Even then it does not properly 
st.ate the rule because it should be "in a light most favor-
able to the verdict." 
The second sentence then states a rule which is en-
tirely different from the rule contended for by us at the 
time of the submission of this case and as of now. 
The Court cites the case of Oberg v. Sanders, 111 
Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229 (1947). This case in no way sup-
ports the rule which this Court elected t,o follow in its 
considel"aition of this case on appeal. In the Oberg case, 
the trial court granted a Motion for a non-suit. The 
Cour.t stated: 
"The question for determination in this 
case is whether the trial court erred in grant-
ing the motion for nonsuit. To decide this ques-
tion we must view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff." 
This case did not hold that it would take into con-
sideration the less favorable evidence against plaintiff's 
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position as this Court st.at.eel it was going to do in this 
case. 
The Oberg case also made reference to the rule con-
cerning weighing of testimony in connection with cross-
examination which has no relevancy here. In connection 
with 1that rule the Court stated as follows: 
"The rule is that the testimony of a wit-
ness is no stronger than where it is left on 
cross-examination.'' 
Apparently the Court takes the view in considering 
this oase that the plainrtiff, by calling a witness, vouches 
for all of his testimony and is bound by it. This just is 
not the rule as was pointed out by this Court in the case 
of Schl.atter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 196 P.2d 968 
( 1948) . In that case, the plaintiff called two witnesses. 
One by the name of Jones who testified in one aspect 
favorably to plaintiff and in another aspect unfavorably. 
Another witness was called by plaintiff who testified 
favorably on the subject Jones had testified unfavorably. 
Plain1Jiff's counsel made the argument that Jones should 
be disbeJ.Iieved and that the testimony of the other witness 
shouJd be followed in connection with his favorable testi-
mony. In addressing itself to this question, this Court 
stated as follows: 
"It is the general rule that a party who calls 
a witness vouches for his veracity, and cannot 
afterward impeach the witness, either by the 
testimony of impeaching witnesses or by argu-
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ment to the jury. The rule is s uh j e ct 
to some exceptions, notably where one 
party must call the adverse p a rt y as a 
witness. But a party is not bound by every 
statement that his witness makes, and he may, 
be testimony of other witnesses and in argu-
ment to the jury, show that the facts were dif-
ferent from those testified to by the witness. 
This is permitted, not for the purpose of im-
peaching the witness (although it may have 
that incidental effect) , but for establishing the 
true facts. It would be a monstrous rule that 
would bind a party to every statement of every 
witness produced by him. It is common ex-
perience that several eye-witnesses to an occur-
rence will have different versions of the same 
transaction. A party who calls several eye-
witnesses is entitled to argue before the jury 
that they should believe the facts to be as testi-
fied to by the witness most favorable to him. 
This is not an attack upon the veracity of the 
other witnesses called by him whose testimony 
may be different in some respects from that 
of others, but merely an attempt to convince 
the jury that the facts are really as contended 
by him. On the other hand, a party who has 
called a witness to help prove his case, and has 
vouched for his credibility, may not thereafter 
argue to the jury that such witness is un-
worthy of belief." 
Within the meaning of this case, the argument by a 
party that the most favorable testimony should be mken 
by the jury to establish his case is not an attack on the 
8 
basis that the witness who testified differently than this 
is unworthy of belief. 
The principle of the Schl.atter case was reaffirmed 
by this Court as late as November, 1972 in the oase of 
Batt v. State, 28 Utah2d 417, 503 P.2d 855 (1972). In 
that case, this Court stated: 
"However, we note here that we are in 
accord with the idea that a party neither has 
to vouch for, nor be bound by, the testimony 
of a person whom he calls as a witness." 
The Court also cited Rule 20 of the Rules of Evi-
dence of Utah. That rule provides: 
"Rule 20. Evidence Generally Affecting 
Credibility. 
Subject to Rules 21 and 22, for the pur-
pose of impairing or supporting the credibility 
of a witness, any party including the party 
calling him may examine him and introduce 
extrinsic evidence concerning any statement 
or conduct by him and any other matter rele-
vant upon the issue of credibility." 
The rule whloh should have been followed by this 
Court has been stated innumerable times. We will not 
attempt to make an exhaustive review of these cases but 
will only cite the more recent oases whl.~h have followed 
the rule. 
In Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Company, 106 
U. 289, 147 P.2d 875 (1'944) on a trial before the lower 
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court, without a Jury, the Court entered a judgment of 
no cause of action. The Court stated the following as the 
rule to be followed in the appellate review of this case: 
"This is a case at law. It therefore follows that 
this appeal is upon question of law alone. That 
being true the function of this court is not to 
pass upon the weight of the evidence, nor to 
determine conflicts therein, but to examine it 
solely for the purpose of determining whether 
or not the judgment finds substantial support 
in the evidence. In so examining the evidence 
all reasonable presumptions are in favor of the 
trial court's findings and judgment, and the 
evidence must be considered in the light most 
favorable to them. If the findings and judg-
ment are substantially supported by the evi-
dence, then the court may not disturb them." 
In Toomer's Estate v. Unum Pacific Railroad Co., 
121 U. 37, 239 P.2d 163 (1951) a verdict in a railroad 
crossing case was for plaintiff and in affirming plaintiff's 
judgment, the Court stated the rule for appellate review 
as follows: 
"The jury, having found the issues in 
favor of the plaintiff, he is entitled to have us 
consider all of the evidence, and every infer-
ence and intendment fairly arising therefrom 
in the light most favorable to him. See Lewis 
v. Rio Grande TVestern Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 
123 P. 97; Cromeenes v. San Pedro. L.A. & 
L. R. Co., 37 Utah 475, 109 P. 10 and see 
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1Vicc v. Illhwis Cent. R. Co., 303 Ill. App. 
:Z!J~. 25 N .E.2d 104." 
In Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Consolidated 
Freightways, et a/,., 121 Utah 379, 242 P.2d 563 (1952) 
the trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff and the 
Court stated that the one question of substance to be 
decided on appeal was whether the record supported the 
finding of the trial court that plaintiff's damage was 
caused by the negligence of the defendant. The Court 
stated the rule as follows: 
"This assignment of error requires merely 
that we examine the record in the aspects most 
favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether 
there is evidence to support the judgment of 
the court below. Beagley v. U. S. Gypsum 
Company, Utah, 23.5 P.2d 783, and cases there 
cited." 
In Gibbons and Reed v. Guthrie, 123 U. 172, 256 P.2d 
706, (1953), this Court, in supporting a trial court judg-
ment, stated the rule as follows: 
"It needs no citation of authority that this 
Court will not redetermine facts found by the 
fact finder in the lower court in law cases if in 
the light most favorable to the respondent the 
evidence is sufficient to sustain such findings." 
In Niemann v. Grand Central Market, lru:., 9 U.2d 
46, 337 P.2d 424 (1959) again in supporting the judg-
ment of the trial court, this Court stated the rule as fol-
lows: 
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"It is well settled in the law that sufficien-
cy of the evidence to support a jury verdict, in 
a law action, must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party. It is equally 
clear that the examination of an appellate 
court is limited to the question of whether there 
is substantial evidence upon which the jury 
could have based its verdict. In our judicial 
system the jury is the trier of fact, their de-
termination of fact, based on face to face con-
tact with each witness and on a first-hand ap-
praisal of the evidence, must be given full con-
sideration. The finding of a jury will be upset 
only when it is clearly not supported by sub-
stantial evidence." 
In Dansak v. Deluke, 12 U.2d 302, 366 P.2d 67 (1961), 
the Court applied the following rule in affirming a trial 
court judgment: 
"This being a case at law it follows that 
this appeal is upon questions of law alone. 
This court cannot pass upon the weight of the 
evidence, nor determine conflicts therein, but 
can only determine whether or not the findings 
and judgment of the trial court find substan-
tial support in the evidence. In so examining 
the evidence, all reasonable presumptions are in 
favor of such findings and judgment, and the 
evidence must be considered in the light most 
favorable to them." 
In some cases the Court has not used the words "most 
favorable" but never, so fiar as we can determine, has it 
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ever used the rule above quoted from the Elton case. 
These other cases have stated that if the evidence is suf-
ficient to support the ve~diot or judgment the trial court 
must be affirmed. 
In Lym v. Tlwmpson, 112 U. 24, 184 P.2d 667 (1947) 
this Court started the rule of appellate review as follows: 
""\Ve are called upon to decide whether 
or not there is evidence in the case that will di-
rectly or by inference support the decision of 
the trier of the facts. In deciding that question 
we decide merely-so far as circumstantial evi-
dence is concerned-that if there are inferences 
to be drawn therefrom that will support the 
lower court's conclusions upon the probabili-
ties of that evidence, we are bound to uphold 
the decision, even though had we been trying 
the case we might have stressed the inferences 
adversely to such a conclusion. We have shown 
above how there are inferences that will sup-
port the lower court's conclusion and therefore 
we must affirm it. It is so ordered." 
The Court, in the Elton case, flew right in the face 
of the rule as stated in the Lym case. 
In Horsky v. Robinson, 112 U. 227, 186 P.2d 592 
(1947) this Court held that it was a constitutional duty 
whioh thris Court had in reviewing a law case and stated: 
"Under a general verdict we cannot be as-
sured what facts the jury found or that they 
found the facts necessary to sustain their 
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Finally, Mrs. Elton's summation of his working hours 
(R. 313) was stated as follows: 
"A. Well, he did, but I mean the way I was 
able to observe my husband, it was because I 
know he had his regular duties in Court, he had 
-he was-he had this Ronnow, this Sunday 
Closing was sort of overlapping in preparing, 
and he spent every single minute studying. 
Like I said, even Sundays, Saturdays and 
Sundays. And this involved the whole family. 
It was just plain miserable. And I could see 
he was building up this pressure. And I told-
there was nothing I could do about it. But 
this is what I feel was it just came to a 
climax." 
From the foregoing evidence, certainly the jury was 
justified in finding that Judge Elton, in the last six weeks 
of his life, was under marked physical and emotional 
stress. 
Turning now to the medical evidence most favorable 
t.o the plaintiff, we call the Courtt's attention, again, to 
plam1liff's Exhlbit 6 which the Court entirely disregarded 
in its Opinion and in which the opinion of Dr. Null, and 
the other doctors, was to the effect that the marked physi-
cal and emotional stress indeed precipitated the deced-
ent's death. This evidence alone is enough to justify the 
jury verdict and, in our opinion, is the evidence most 
favorable to the plaintiff's JX>Siltion in ,this case. 
However, a review of the medical evidence produced 
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by plaintiff requires, under what we consider well estab-
lished rules of Utah law, affinnance of the judgment be-
low. 
Dr. Robert M. Dalrymple was Judge Elton's treafutg 
physician. Judge Elton had suffered his first stroke on 
January 9, 1969 (R. 319) but, under the evidence, the 
jury in this case could well have found that by April 21, 
1970, he had recovered. We will attempt to show this 
by a reference to Dr. Dalrymple's testimony. 
Dr. Dalrymple saw the Judge on Ap:ril 1, 1969 and 
at that time he had returned to work although he could 
not say he had returned to fuH time work (R. 323). Dr. 
Dalrymple saw the Judge in May, June, July, August~ 
September and October, 1969 (R. 323). He stated that 
he continued to improve during that time and on October 
3, 1969, he was doing a full day's work (R. 324). Dr. 
Dalrymple continued t.o see him through April 20, 1970. 
He stated that on February 23, 1970, he was doing well 
and that on March 23, 1970, "everything was satisfactory, 
no change" (R. 324 and 325). On April 20, 1970 his medi-
cine was reduced "because he was doing quilfie satisfuct.or-
ily" (R. 325). 
It must be remembered it was during this latter per-
iod of time that, according to the foregoing testimony, the 
Judge was under a great deal of physical and emolfliomtl 
stress because of the work he was doing and the burden 
of the sensitive cases he was deciding. From this date 
on, it was all downhiU where before this time his pro-
gress had been uphill. 
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The jury could well have found, and this Court 
should sustain iit, that the stresses and the strains were 
what caused the ensuing physioa.l deterioration of Judge 
Elton. 
Judge Elton was brought intx> Dr. Dalrymple's office 
on April 21, 1970 by his wife in such a condition that he 
assumed the Judge had had another stroke (R. 325). On 
April 28, 1970, he had another episode wmoh the dootor 
described as "not good" (R. 326). He then saw the Judge 
again on May 2, 1970 and, concerning his condition, he 
testified as follows: 
"Q. Did you know anything about the work 
load that he was assuming during this period 
of time? 
A. All I knew about it was that he had been 
working hard. I had suggested he cut down, 
but he was a very impulsive individual, and 
he would not listen very well. 
Q. Did you know anything about these cases, 
the name of them, the Sunday Closing Law or 
have any knowledge of those? 
A. I had heard rumors of them, sir, but they 
didn't mean much to me. 
Q. During this period of time, did you form 
an opinion as to whether or not he was suffer-
ing under some stress? 
A. Oh, I don't think there was any doubt 
about it, sir." (R. 327). 
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We, again, call the Court's attention to plaffitiff's 
Exhibit 6 wherein it was the opinion of Dr. Null that this 
physical and emotional stress, from which Judge Elton 
was suffering, precipitated his death. How, in the face 
of this evidence, can this Court overrule the jury's finding 
that it was stress toot was the proximate cause of the 
death of Judge Elum? That is what this testimony means 
and this is the finding this testimony supports. 
The Judge died on May 13, 1970 and DT. Dalrymple 
testified that the immediate cause of death was circula-
tory collapse. This, in tum, was due to damage of the 
brain, in other words, "all his reflexes went to pot and 
he collapsed" (R. 329). Dr. Dalrymple further testified: 
"* * * I would just have to say in my own 
opinion that this man was well and doing well, 
and something drove him to pot, and I think 
he was under servere stress." ( R. 331). 
Here again we pause to have the CoUTt reflect upon 
this evidence and answer the question, how in the world 
can this Court find, in view of this testimony, that the 
finding of the jury toot the stress was the sole cause of 
the death of Judge Elton on May 13, 1970 was not justi-
fied by the evidence. 
At this point, we call the Court's attention to the 
case of White v. Natwnal Postal Transport Association, 
1 U.2d 5, 261 P.2d 924 (1953), in which, in a very similar 
si1tuation, the Court held that it was proper to submit to 
the jury whether or not the decedent had died from an 
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accident defined as sudden, violent death from an ex-
ternal violent and accideilltal means resulting directly, in-
dependellltly and exclusively from any other causes. The 
Court stated: 
"At the trial respondent proceeded on the 
theory that the accidental blow to White's leg 
(I) reactivated or "lighted up" an inactive 
heart condition which led to his death, or ( 2) 
the blow started an unbroken chain of cir-
cumstances which led to his death independent-
ly of any contributing cause. Instructions em-
bracing these two theories were presented to 
the jury and it is the giving of those instruc-
tions which is assigned as error by the appel-
lant who contends that the respondent failed 
to adduce evidence to support a jury finding 
under either theory." 
In that case, the prior oondition had reached a sin-
tionary period and the Court held it was proper to sub-
mirt that case on both of the theories indicated in the 
foregoing quotation. 
Dr. Dalrymple testified that Judge Elton was under 
undue stress and he did not think he was going to die 
that fast (R. 332) . 
Tills Court was totally wrong in saying that Judge 
Eltxm suffered from a lingering progressive heart disease. 
Dr. Dalrymple testified oontrary to the Court's statement 
when he ,testified "He (Judge Elton) had no heart trou-
ble until he died" (R. 345) . 
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On the question of the unexpectedness of JudgE 
Elron's death, Dr. Dalrymple testified in his deposition 
as follows: 
"* * * were you suprised by this development 
in a medical sense? 
A. In a way, yes. He was doing so well, I 
really was quite shocked that he had this sud-
<len* * *." (R. 358). 
He further testified: 
"A. As I said before, sir, the only thing is if 
one person has a stroke, they are always suspi-
cious they will have another, but people live a 
long period of time and never have another 
stroke. I was just being extra cautious and 
trying to do some preventative medicine rather 
than treating him by the observation. I had no 
assurance that Mr. Elton was going to have 
another stroke." (R. 359). 
The hospital records of May 13, 1970 (Exhibit 3-P) 
further support the jury's verdict by the following quo-
tation: 
"Patient has been followed by myself since 
that time and has had some weakness and head-
ache for the past two weeks which have been 
associated with considerable emotional stress 
due to his work as a jurist. 
Approximately 2 hours before admission pa-
tient had rather sudden onset of weakness and 
cyanosis and was immediately brought to the 
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hospital by ambulance. There is no history of 
recent chest pain, hemoptysis or dyspnea." 
The favorable testimony of Dr. Clyde Null also sup-
ports the jury verdiot and this Court should look at this 
testimony favorably and we are sure, if it does, that it 
will conclude that the jury verdict was suported by suffi-
cienrt evidence. 
Dr. Null described the stroke in January, 1969, and 
which apparently was the same as the one of May 13, 
1970, as a "cerebral cardiovascular accident" (R. 370). 
Dr. Null testified as follows on cross-examination 
when counsel was seeking to get the dootor to testify 
that Judge Elton was going 1;o die from the progression 
of his condition: 
"Q. And when you-when the condition gets 
so bad-I mean eventually this person, as the 
condition progresses, is going to die from the 
progression of this condition? 
A. That's not really necessarily true, sir. It 
is a common clinical observation that we can-
not always-we simply can't answer all of 
these in that fashion. People will have a stroke, 
they will have symptoms of vascular insuffi-
ciency and this will go on for years, and others 
do not. And there are a whole host of factors 
which influence that." ( R. 383) . 
We respectfully submit that if the Court will follow 
the rule limiting its appellate review as indicated by the 
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cases heretofore cited, we are satisfied that no other con-
clusion can be reached than that the evidence supported 
the finding by the jury that there was a bodily injury 
defined by the doctors as a cerebral cariovascular acci-
dent and that the stress, which Judge Elton was under 
by virtue of his judicial duties~ was the proximate pre-
cipitating cause of his death. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
A PRE-EXISTING DISEASE WOULD PRE-
VENT RECOVERY UNDER THIS POLICY 
OF INSURANCE. 
Respondent's position, in filing her Brief in this mat-
ter, was to meet the arguments and the theories set forth 
by appellant in claiming that error had been committed. 
In this regard, it is respectfully suggested that the re-
spondent did meet the appellant's theory. But, more 
importantly and critical 1;o the issue in this case, is the 
faot that the cases relied upon by the Court, in reversing 
the jury verdiot, were not mentioned by the appellant 
in his Brief. The Court relied upon the following cases: 
Smith v. Continental Casualty Com'{X1ny, Dist. of Col. 
CT. App., 203 A.2d 168 (1964), Bewley v. American 
Home Assurance, 450 F.2d 1079 (1971), Love v. Ameri-
can Casualty Company, 202 F.Supp. 47 (1961), Landress 
v. P00enix Ins. Co., 291 U. S. 491, 54 S.Ct. 461, 78 L.Ed. 
934 (1934), Mutual Benefit v. Hudman, 398 S.W.2d 110 
(1965). 
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As was stated, these cases were not cited by appel-
lant and, as such, a Petition for Rehearing should be 
granted in all fairness to allow respondent to reply to the 
effect of these cases. This is particularly important in 
this instance since the cases cited by the Court sustain 
a view that has been specifically rejected by numerous 
Utah cases. 
In Smith v. American Casualty Company, supra, but, 
more importantly, in Bewley v. American Home Assur-
ance, supra, the appellate courts took the position that 
the principle of proximate cause, applied ordinarily in 
negligence cases, does not apply in construing insurance 
liability cases. That is, these cases hold that if there is 
any concurrence of accidental injury or pre-existing bod-
ily infirmity or disease, that it is "irrelevant whether the 
bodily infirmity or disease is a proximate oause of death 
or the remote cause, because recovery on the policy is 
precluded merely if the infirmity or disease is a contrib-
uting cause of death." 
This Court cites Mutual Benefit v. Hudman, supra, 
where there was no evidence that the accident did pre-
oipiJtarte the decedent's death. It appears, however, that 
the construction, put by this Court on this case, is erron-
eous because a later case from the same jurisdiotiion, 
Mutual Benefit v. Ratliff, 440 S.W.2d 119, stated wirth 
regard to the issue of causation: 
"The Court clearly states in Hudman that 
they were not holding that every pre-existing 
frailty or enfeeblement of the human body 
which exists at the time of an accident will de-
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feat recovery under policies similar to the one 
invoh'ed in Hudman. The Court cites with ap-
proval Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Insnr-
ance Company, 254 N.Y. 81, 171 N.E. 914 
( 1930) in which Chief Justice Cardozo said: 
" 'A policy of insurance is not accepted 
with the thought that its coverage is to be re-
stricted to an Apollo or a Hercules.' 
Competent evidence of qualified persons 
separated the real causes of Mr. Ratliff's death 
from mere conditions thereby raising issues of 
fact which the Court has found against Appel-
lant. Appellant's no evidence points are over-
ruled.'' 
As mentioned earlier, Utah does not follow this strict 
rule of sole cause but, rather, has, on numerous occasions, 
refuted such narrow construction. See Whitlock v. Old 
American Insurance Company, 21 U.2d 131, 442 P.2d 26 
(1968). The Court stated as follows: 
"It is appreciated that insurance com-
panies in issuing these accident policies make 
perfectly legitimate efforts to so word them 
as to exclude death caused by disease and to 
cover only death caused by accident. N otwith-
standing differences in wording in attempting 
to accomplish that objective, it is generally 
held that insofar as coverage for accident is 
concerned, the insurer takes the insured as he 
is; that even though he may have some diseased 
condition which would eventually result in his 
death, or that the injury would not have re-
sulted in death to a more robust person, if an 
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accident occurs which hw;tcns his death, re-
covery can be had under the policy. The criti-
cal question to be determined is whether the 
real and efficient cause, or as sometimes stated, 
the proximate cause of death was the disease, 
or the accident1 , and where the evidence would 
reasonably permit a finding either way, the 
issue is for the jury." (Emphasis added). 
(Footnote 7 is as follows: 
1 Hassing v. JJJutual Life Ins. Co., 108 Utah 
198, 159 P.2d 117 ( 1945) and cases cited there-
in; Fetter v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 174 Mo. 
256, 73 S.W. 592, 61 L.R.A. 459 (1903); 
Kundiger v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 
219 Minn. 25, 17 N.W.2d 49 (1944). See also 
DiEnes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 21 Utah2d 
147' 442 p .2d 468 ( 1968) . ) 
After making the foregoing statement; that is, that 
the central issue involves the question of proximate cause, 
the Court spooifically adopted the holdings of two oases 
that involve fact situations almost identical with the facts 
in this case. 
"A case supporting this view which is close to 
our own on its facts is Brooks v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co., 27 Cal.2d 305, 163 P.2d 
689 ( 1943). Even though the deceased had had 
incurable cancer the Court stated that the pres-
ence of such a pre-existing disease would not 
relieve the insurer from liability if the accident 
was the prime or moving cause of the death. 
In Gennari v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 
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Jiu. (1!.>60), 335 S.\V.2d 55, the defendant 
company claimed that the death was caused by 
a prior condition of hypertensive cardiovas-
cular disease and arteriosclerosis. 'The Court 
stated that "'It is well settled that although a 
person may have a weakened body*** as the 
result of * * * disease nonetheless if death is 
directly caused by * * * accidental means * * * 
recovery may be had * * * if he dies by reason 
of it, even if he would not have died if his pre-
vious health had been different. In such event 
the condition of previous health is merely a 
predisposing and remote cause and not the 
direct, proximate cause, as contemplated by the 
policy, notwithstanding such condition ,might 
have cooperated, concurred in and contributed 
to death'." (Emphasis added). 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT 
THE WORD "ACCIDENT" IN AN INSUR-
ANCE POLICY SHOULD BE CONSTRUED 
DIFFERENTLY FROM THE WORD "ACCI-
DENT" IN A WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION OR RETIREMENT STATUTE. 
The word "accident" is in common every day use in 
the English language. Just why it should have a differ-
eDJt meaning one place than another is really hard to un-
derstand. An accident is an accident. 
This Court has held that stress and strain constitutes 
an accident under the very same facts as were presented 
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t.o the Court and jury in the case at bar. Elton v. Utah 
Retirement Board, 28 U.2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972) in 
wmch the Court stated that it had heret;ofore held: 
"* * * that an internal failure brought about 
by exertion in the course of employment may 
be an accident within the meaning of the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Powers v. In-
dustrial Commission, 19 Utah2d 140, 427 P.2d 
740 (1967). The Utah Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act employs language identical to that 
found in the Judges Retirement Act above 
quoted." 
Testimony in the previous Elton case is as follows: 
"The persons who knew him best-his wife, his 
colleagues, his clerk, his baliff and the law-
yers who practiced before him-all testified to 
the deterioration of his health, brought upon 
by the stresses of the highly sensitive cases 
handled by him during the last six weeks of his 
life. His physician testified that Judge Elton 
suffered from vascular disease, resulting in in-
sufficient blood supply to the brain, and that 
this condition was aggravated by the stresses of 
Judge Elton's employment and that these 
stresses were the principal factor in cutting 
short his Zif e." (Emphasis added). 
It then ruled as follows: 
"The record supports the trial court's conclu-
sion that Judge Elton died as a result of an 
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at:cident arising out of or in the course of his 
employment, and under the traditional rules 
of review the judgment of that court will not 
be disturbed. The judgment of the trial court 
is affirmed, no costs a warded." 
It is impossible to understand how this Court could 
make the word "accident" have different meanings in 
different areas of the law. This is simply not justified 
on any logical basis, yet one of the interesting things 
about the holding of the Court is that it is based on the 
flat-out statement that there should be a distinction be-
tween Workmen's Compensation language and insurance 
policy language. The Court does this without the cita-
tion of a single authority. We think for the Court to take 
off on a new theory of law in the face of authority in this 
state directly agamst this holding is, to say the leastt, 
not in the highest tradition of the law. 
We may OOlk all we want about the differences be-
tween statutes and insurance policies, but we always 
must return to the simple fact that we are only constru-
ing a common every day word "accident" and iJt should 
have the same meanling wherever used. 
In Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance Com-
pany, 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017 (1921), it was expressly 
held that "accident" should mean the same in an insur-
ance policy as it later was construed to mean in staitutes. 
In view of the fact that this Court has overruled. the 
Richards case, it should not permit this ruling to be given 
retroactive operation. As this Court points out, the mat-
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ter is contractual and the parties contracted at a time 
that the Richards case was in effect and certainly could 
rely upon that case as indicating what constituted an 
accident within the meaning of the policy issued to Judge 
Elton. The law is to the effect that in such a situation, 
the overruling authority should not be given retroactive 
enforcement. See Williams v. Utah State Depar.tment 
of Finances, 23 U.2d 438, 464 P.2d 596 (1970), and Draper 
v. Travelers Insurance Company, 429 F.2d 44 (1970) (10 
CCA), 10 ALR3rd 1371. 
These same authorities apply to the Whitlock case, 
supra, wmch has, we submit, been overruled by this Court 
in the Elton case. Whether or not this should have retro-
active effect, should be considered at length by the Court 
on rehearing. 
Because of the action of the Court, these issues were 
not presented to the Court at the time of the filing of 
the Briefs and arguing. 
We certainly believe that this matter should be con-
sidered by the Court for the first time on a rehearing. 
Also, along this line, the Court again makes what we 
believe to be a misstatement. It states "by and large the 
authorities cited by plamtiff are Workmen's Compensa-
tion cases." This just simply is not true. There are 12 
insurance cases cited as against 5 Workmen's Compensa-
tion and Retirement cases. 
Why, in all fairness, does the Court make this state-
ment? 
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CONCLUSION 
We wonder whaJt happened to the analogy to tlUs 
case made by a member of the Court presenting the ques-
tion of a hemophiliac cutting his finger and dying which 
he would not have done except for the hemophilia. 
In such a situation, the member of the Court indi-
cated that certainly the cutting of the finger would be 
the sole cause of death. 
Under the foregoing arguments and authoriitiies, we 
submiit that the Court should reverse itseH and affirm 
the verdict and judgment of the triaJ. court, or at a mini-
mum, should grant a rehearing so the matters set forth 
herein could be presented to the Court, some of them for 
the first time. 
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